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ABSTRACT
Although individual lending is not unusual in microfinance, group lending, 
however, is considered as more common in this field. Through group 
lending, all group members are made responsible for the repayment of 
their loans. The group-based model financing is also viewed as effective 
in transferring the risk from the providers to the borrowers by imposing 
the social cost on the borrowers. Despite the high repayment rate recorded 
by the group-based microfinance institutions, there are arguments that this 
method of financing may lead to “social loafing”, a concept related to a 
reduction of an individual’s effort when working in a group. As there is 
limited research in this area, this study aims to explore the existence of 
such scenario in the largest and oldest microfinance institution in Malaysia, 
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia. Based on the observation and interviews with the 
members of the organization, this study found that to some extent “social 
loafing” does exist in Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia. Although the situation is 
not common, “social loafing” is a serious issue that needs to be controlled 
in the organization as it is believed that it is contagious and may affect the 
whole organization in a long run.  
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INTRODUCTION
Promulgated in 1970s by Professor Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh, 
microfinance is often related to providing small loans without any collateral 
to the poor with the intention to improve their socio-economic conditions. 
Although individual lending is not unusual in microfinance, group lending 
however is considered as more common in this area. Moreover, the most 
replicated microfinance programme, Grameen is based on group lending. 
Generally, in group lending, all group members are jointly liable for the 
repayment of their loan (Eijkel, Hermes & Lensink, 2011). According to 
Becchetti and Pisani (2008), the performance of group lending microfinance 
institutions (MFI) is outstanding as the average loan loss for microfinance 
institutions worldwide is only at 1%. Moreover, previous studies also 
highlighted the effectiveness of group-based model in transferring the risk 
from the providers to the recipients of the micro credit by imposing the 
“social cost” on the borrowers (Stiglitz, 1990; Zhang, 2008). “Social cost” 
is the situation related to ones’ reputation in the community, loss of dignity 
and trust. To avoid stigma among the community members, borrowers were 
‘forced’ to repay their debts at a stipulated time period (Montgomerry, 1996; 
Premchamider, 2006; Yunus, 2007). Thus, unsurprisingly, some studies 
showed that the majority of the group lending type of MFIs haecorded nearly 
100% repayment rate such as CARD Rural Bank in the Philippines, Amanah 
Ikhtiar Malaysia, and Funding the Poor Cooperative (FPC) in China (AIM, 
2013; Hassan, 2013; Park & Ren, 2001; Seibel & Torres, 1999). 
Based on these studies, it was concluded that group lending is efficient 
in ensuring almost perfect repayment rate among the borrowers. However, 
reviewing the situation in-depth, it seems that the perfect repayment rate 
neither reflects an increase in income of the borrowers nor moving them 
up from the poverty stage as the original intention of the establishment of 
the MFIs in 1970s. The almost 100% repayment rate of the MFIs simply 
suggests that their clients are paying their loans, regardless of their financial 
performance after borrowing from the MFIs. As the borrowers are bearing 
the “social cost”, they are obliged to repay their debts either by using their 
own money from the successful projects, or even borrowing from others 
such as family members or other micro entrepreneurs in their groups if 
they experience any project failure. Moreover, due to the nature of the 
group lending, the liabilities are shared among the members, thus, forcing 
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the other members to willingly repay the loan of the defaulters within their 
groups as any failure in repayment may jeopardize their chances to secure 
further loans from the MFIs.   
Among practitioners or even scholars, there is a heated argument on 
lending to a group of people. It was argued that although group lending is 
effective in assuring credit repayment, individual borrower’s reliance on 
other group members to repay the loan gives the former an incentive to free 
ride due to the “social loafing” (Abbink, Irlenbusch & Renner, 2006; Gine 
& Karlan, 2014; Kodongo & Kendi, 2013; Kono, 2014). Basically, “social 
loafing” is a concept related to a reduction of an individual’s effort when 
working in a group (Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979; Simms & nicholas, 
2014). Physical tasks such as rope pulling (Ringelmann’s experiment 
in 1913) and clapping and shouting (see Latane, Williams and Harkins 
experiment in 1979) or cognitive tasks such as evaluating poems by Petty, 
Harkins, Williams and Latane in 1977, lab experiments conducted suggested 
that individuals put less effort while working in a group as compared to 
working alone (Simms & nicholas, 2014).
In Malaysia, AIM is considered as the oldest and biggest MFI in the 
country (nawai & Shariff, 2011). Adopting the Grameen Bank model, 
AIM practices a group based model and provides small amounts of loans 
without any collateral imposed on their clients (known as sahabat). As 
AIM is based on group lending there is a high possibility that the free-riders 
do exist among the sahabats, however there is no known study on this 
issue. Therefore, this study attempts to further contribute by exploring the 
existence of such scenario in the organization. In AIM, although sahabats 
of AIM are not directly working together in a project, they are inevitably 
required to indirectly monitor the performance of other sahabats in their 
groups, as they are jointly liable on the loan repayments of their colleagues. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia (AIM)
Officially registered as a Private Trust Corporation in September 
1987, AIM’s main objective is to reduce the incidence of poverty among the 
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poorest households in Malaysia by financing additional income generating 
activities via disbursement of benevolent loans. Started as a pilot project in 
the northwest Selangor, AIM is currently serving more than 350,000 clients 
all over Malaysia with cumulative financing of more than RM12 billion 
(AIM, 2016). Adopting the Grameen Bank model, AIM practises a group 
based model and provides small amounts of loans without any collateral 
imposed on their clients (known as sahabat1). Sahabat is the term used 
by AIM for its clients. During an interview session with Mingguan Wanita 
magazine, Datuk Hajah Zabidah Ismail, the then Managing Director of AIM, 
said that the term sahabat took the spirit of brotherhood of the companions 
of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh2) who mutually supported each other through 
thick and thin. Through the emotional bond, it is expected that the AIM 
sahabat would support each other and have no doubt in reminding other 
sahabats on their faults. She further added that this brotherhood concept 
was vital in AIM and is one of the “secret ingredients” of the effectiveness 
of the AIM programme (Abdul Kadir, September 2013). 
In order to achieve their main objective, three types of products are 
provided by AIM, namely; Financing, Compulsory Savings, and Sahabat 
Charity and Welfare Fund. Under the financing scheme, AIM offers seven 
different types of loans that include both economic and social loans to their 
eligible sahabat. The loans are the (i) Economic loans of I-Mesra, I-Srikandi, 
I-Wibawa, I-Wawasan, and I-Penyayang, (ii) Education loan of I-Bistari, 
and (iii) Multipurpose loan of I-Sejahtera. Being awarded as the “Best 
Islamic Microfinance Institution” for three consecutive years from 2013 
to 2015 by the Global Islamic Finance Awards (GIFA), AIM is committed 
to ensuring that the institution complies with the shariah3 requirement 
(Omar, 2014). Therefore, as an Islamic Microfinance Institution, AIM is 
not charging any interest to the sahabat. Using Qardhul Hasan (Benevolent 
Loan) as the basis of their financing contract, there is no interest or profit 
being charged to the borrowers for each type of the loans. However, for its 
operating cost, AIM charges an administrative fee at the flat rate of 10% 
per annum for each loan (AIM, 2013; Kadri, 2011). Although the service 
charge of 10% is debatable (Skully, 2011), according to Ebrahim (2010), the 
charge is inevitable in order to ensure the sustainability of the institution. 
However, he added that the charges should not be based on the interest rate. 
1 good friend 
2 peace be upon him 
3 Islamic law
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Furthermore, Hassan (2013) claimed that the average cost of financing for 
AIM between 2001 and 2008 was at the average of 11%. Therefore, she 
stated that the 10% administrative fee is reasonable and has been approved 
by the Shariah Panel Committee as it is not based on the interest rate, “but 
to compensate the cost directly spent to render such service” (p. 71). 
Moreover, each sahabat is also required to contribute in the 
“Compulsory Savings” amounting from RM14 to RM15 per week depending 
on their loan size. The compulsory savings are collected during the 
compulsory weekly meetings and may be borrowed by the sahabat within 
the same group who might have shortage in paying their loans. However, 
the amount borrowed must be repaid as soon as possible by the sahabat 
once they have the money. Besides, the Sahabat Charity and Welfare Fund 
(Tabung Kebajikan dan Kesejahteraan Sahabat, TKKS) was established in 
2006 to meet the demands of the sahabats. Among others, the objective of 
this fund is to improve the welfare of the sahabats and to help them during 
difficult times such as during the death of their family members, natural 
disasters, or health problems. In addition, TKKS provides some contribution 
for the sahabats to perform Haj in Mecca and for the sahabats’ children to 
enrol at the university. However, in order to receive the benefits from this 
fund, sahabats are required to contribute RM 1.00 per month or RM 12.00 
per annum into the TKKS. 
In general, to become the sahabat, the participants must be above 
18 years old and have a household income of lesser than RM3,050. After 
confirming their eligibility to participate in AIM, the applicants are required 
to form a group of five from the same neighbourhood. They are also required 
to complete a 5-day course (1.5 hours per day) known as “Proses Penurunan 
Kuasa” (or Handing Down Authority). During the course, the potential 
sahabats are exposed to the AIM rules and regulations, credit discipline, 
and responsibility of the sahabats as individuals, group members, and 
members of the centre. At the end of the course, the potential sahabats are 
tested on their honesty, responsibility, and accountability by the AIM officers 
before being accepted into the programme. With a minimum of 2 groups 
and a maximum of 10 groups, a centre will be formed and all sahabats are 
required to attend the centre’s weekly meeting. All AIM transactions such as 
loan applications, loan repayments, and collections of compulsory savings 
4 RM 1.00 = 0.24 USD 
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will be held during this centre weekly meeting (Abdul Kadri, September 
2013; AIM, 2013).
Empirical studies conducted on AIM have shown that the program has 
a positive socio-economic impact. Gibbons and Kassim (1990) found that 
there was a significant increase of sahabat’s monthly household income 
after participating in the AIM’s microcredit scheme. A similar result was 
found in a study conducted by the Social Science and Economic Research 
Unit (SERU) of the Prime Minister’s Department in 1990. The impact 
study discovered that the overall household income had been increasing 
significantly from RM197.78 to RM465.66 per month after joining the AIM 
program. SERU (1990) also examined the impact of AIM on the quality 
of life of sahabat by analyzing the ownership and quality of housing, 
type and quality of household assets, agricultural land and also savings. 
Moreover, a research comparing the household incomes, expenses, savings 
and assets of the AIM participants with non-participants identified that the 
AIM participants’ overall financial performance were better as compared 
to the non-participants (Salma, 2004). Furthermore, a few studies indicated 
that the Malaysia’s achievement in significantly reducing the poverty rate 
from 16.5% in 1990 to only 3.6% in 2007 is highly related to the AIM 
microfinance schemes as this was also the period when AIM provided 
financial services to the poor and hardcore poor households in Malaysia 
(Gibbons & Kassim, 1990; Mamun, Abdul Wahab, & Malarvizhi, 2011). 
Loan Repayment
Similar to other group-based modeling MFIs, AIM has constantly been 
reporting a high repayment rate. In 2010 for instance, AIM has made a claim 
on what was considered as the world’s highest repayment rate of 99.2% 
(Fox, July 2010). Commenting on the reported figure, the then Chairman 
of AIM, Datuk Amir Hamzah Ahmad claimed that the high repayment rate 
was possible in the organization as they have high quality borrowers (2010). 
In more recent years, the reported figure have also been constant at around 
99%. For example, 99.54% in September 2012; 99.36% in March 2013; 
and 98.9% in June 2015 (AIM, 2016). Following the Grameen approach, 
AIM practises a small repayment system where the sahabats are required 
to make the payment weekly during the centre meeting. However, no legal 
action will be taken by the AIM if the sahabats failed to make the payment 
(Mamun, Wahab, Malarvizhi & Mariapun, 2011). 
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Social Loafing
As AIM is based on group lending there is high possibility that the 
free-riders do exist among the sahabats. Free-Rider theory is often used to 
explain the situation where an individual is receiving benefits without any 
or minimal cost borne by him or her. Explaining the Olson’s Free-Rider 
theory, Albanese and Van Fleet (1985) argued that the theory was originally 
concerned primarily with the provision of public goods to the large group 
of individuals. Theoretically, it was argued that providing free products or 
services to individuals may result in inefficiency and under provision of 
those goods or services. Although the free-rider issue is common in the 
context of public goods (Ihori, 2017), similar concepts have also been 
applied to discuss other issues such as group performance (Piezon & 
Donaldson, 2005; Ruël, Bastiaans & nauta, 2003; Thavikulwat & Chang, 
2014), optimum size of the jury (Mukhopadhaya, 2003), trade investment 
(Battaglini, nunnari & Palfrey, 2014; Shasha & Jingping, 2014), and union 
membership (Powdthavee, 2011). 
With regards to group performance, previous studies suggested that 
free-rider was highly related with the “social loafing”, a phenomenon related 
to the inefficiency of individuals working in a group (Karau & Williams, 
1993; Simms & nicholas, 2014; Smith, 2017). Started with the Ringelmann 
experiment in 1913 on a group of people pulling on a rope, “social loafing” 
suggested that individuals tend to exert less effort when working in a group 
as compared to working individually (Simms & nicholas, 2014). In general 
it is believed that “social loafing” is caused by an individual feeling that 
his or her effort has no effect on the group performance as a whole, thus 
reducing the person’s motivation level.
In the context of group financing, more recent studies have highlighted 
the possibilities of strategic default through free-riding (Allen, 2012; 
Breza, 2012; Kurosaki & Khan, 2012). Free-riding was defined as “the 
problem of the non-performing group member who reaps the benefit of 
the accomplishments of the remaining group members without little or 
no cost to him/herself” (Morris & Hayes, 1997, p. 3). The experiment 
conducted in Vietnam by Kono (2014), for instance found that an individual 
tend to free-ride under the group financing scheme especially when there 
are other group members who are irresponsible in repaying their loans in 
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the previous round of the experiment. To test the economic theory, Kono 
(2014) conducted a series of experimental repayment games in Quang ngai 
Province, one of the poorest provinces in Vietnam in August and September 
2008. Throughout the experiments, 360 subjects were involved with 347 
subjects were considered as valid. 
During the experiments, subjects were randomly grouped into either 
a group of two or six. In each round of the experiment, subjects were given 
loans to earn some random predetermined income. Later, after observing 
their own income plus the group members’, they had to decide whether to 
repay their loan or not. If some members in the group did not repay their 
own loans, other group members were asked to pay on their behalf. In the 
next round of the games, defaulting individuals (individual liability) or 
groups (joint liability) were prohibited to further involvement. From the 
experiments, Kono (2014) noted that a subject tends to choose the option 
of defaulting when other members in the same group are likely to default. 
This is highly related with the fact that under the group lending, all group 
members are required to cover for the defaulting borrowers in their groups, 
thus discouraging them to repay their own loan. Overall, Kono (2014) 
confirmed the theory as he found the existence of free-riding under the 
joint liability and no evidence of free-riding under the individual liability. 
As there is no other known empirical study investigating the problems of 
free-riding under the joint liability lending, the findings by Kono (2014) 
should be revisited as the impact is significant to the microfinance industry 
in the long run. 
As previous studies on AIM have mainly examined the impact of the 
programme on the clients, there are no known studies on the existence of 
social loafing or free riding in the organization. As AIM is based on group 
financing, thus prone to this social problem, this study therefore aims to 
explore the presence of social loafing or free riding in AIM by focusing on 
the 6 AIM branches in Selangor. 
METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH DESIGN
Due to the exploratory nature of the research, this study adopts a qualitative 
method that combines both observation and interviews. For the purpose of 
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this study, 21 centre meetings in Selangor were observed between April and 
June 2015. Centre meetings are crucial in AIM as all AIM transactions such 
as loan applications, loan repayments, and collections of compulsory savings 
are held during this centre’s weekly meeting (Abdul Kadir, September 2013; 
AIM, 2013). In general, based on the observation, the weekly meetings are 
held in among the sahabats and the AIM Trust Officer, normally called as 
cikgu (or teacher) by the sahabats. The weekly meetings are compulsory 
for all the sahabats. Depends on the number of groups in each centre, there 
were between 20 and 60 sahabats attending each meeting. Starting the 
weekly meetings with the pledge and pray recitation, the meetings were 
normally continued with the loan repayments, new loan applications, and 
new loan approvals. Any arising issues among sahabats and AIM and future 
activities such as leadership training were also discussed in the meeting. The 
meetings generally took about an hour, and after the meetings, there was 
the opportunity to chat casually with some of the sahabats about AIM and 
their daily activities including the existence of free-riders in their centres or 
groups. Based on the connection build during the meetings, a few sahabats 
were approached on their willingness to be interviewed for the purpose of 
this study. Later, 12 sahabats were interviewed via telephone to further 
understand their stand on the “free-riding” issue. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Observation during the Weekly Meetings
Based on the observation during the weekly meetings, two main issues 
were found highly related with the free-riding problems; i) attendance rate 
and ii) method of collection. As all AIM transactions are conducted in 
the meetings and AIM has made it compulsory for all sahabats to attend 
the meetings (bad attendance may affect their new loan applications), it 
is expected that the attendance rate was high at all centres. However, as 
two-thirds of the centres observed recorded more than 90% attendance rate 
(with 5 centres recorded full attendance), only six centres recorded between 
70% and 90% attendance. Shockingly, it is even noted that one centre has 
less than 40% attendance. This situation is alarming as not attending the 
compulsory weekly meeting indicated that the centre is not fully functioning, 
thus affecting the repayment rate at the centre. Consequently, it will also 
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affects the new loan applications by other sahabats in the particular centre. 
Asking about the situation, we were informed by these sahabats that others 
refuse to attend the meeting as they did not want to pay for the defaults. 
It started with one sahabat who refused to pay for her loan, forcing other 
members to repay on her behalf. As the situation was not properly controlled 
from the beginning, it became worse. As some sahabats felt cheated with 
the situations and decided to quit from the programme, some even decided 
to stop paying their own loan as they realized that no legal actions were 
taken against the earlier defaulters. As it was getting worse, AIM was even 
considering closing the particular centre, a decision that was not new to the 
organization according to the cikgu of the centre. As a result, AIM had to 
bear the losses, while the obliged sahabats would miss the opportunity to 
borrow from AIM in the future. More importantly, other sahabats in other 
centres might learn to take advantage from the situations, thus strategize 
to default. 
Besides the attendance, it was also observed that different centres 
have different methods or strategies to collect the money from those who 
were unable to pay for their loans. Observing the loan collection process 
during the meeting, in general, each group leader will collect the money 
from their group members during the meeting. The leader will then 
announce the amount collected to all members in the centre and passed the 
money to the treasurer of the centre. The treasurer is normally appointed 
among the sahabats annually. After the treasurer collects the money from 
all group leaders, the total amount is then verified and surrendered to the 
cikgu witnessed by all members in the centre. Those who are unable to 
attend the meetings for various reasons would normally pass the money 
to the group leaders prior to the meeting. However, problems arise when 
a sahabat failed to make her payment either purposely or unintentionally. 
Based on the observations, it was found that each cikgu has different ways 
to tackle the issue such as:
1. allow sahabat to use group savings
 All sahabats are required to contribute in the “Compulsory Savings” 
amounting from RM1 to RM15 per week depending on their loan size. 
The savings were kept in the group savings and some cikgu allow the 
sahabat to use money from the group savings to repay his/her loan 
for that particular week. The money, however, needs to be repaid as 
soon as possible as it also consists of other group members’ savings. 
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2. collect money from the group members
 Instead of using the group savings, some cikgu asked other group 
members to repay on behalf of the particular sahabats as according 
to the cikgu, group members are responsible to help the sahabats. 
Moreover, AIM is practising a joint liability scheme. 
3. collect money from all sahabats in the centre (sometimes including 
the cikgu)
 It was also observed that a number of cikgu requested each sahabat in 
the centre to share the burden together instead of the members of the 
group. Therefore, the total amount that was to be paid by the particular 
sahabat was divided among the sahabats attending the meeting for the 
day in the centre. It is believed that by using this method, the amount 
paid by each sahabat is not significant as compared to the b) method 
above. Interestingly, some cikgu also felt responsible to pay on behalf 
of the sahabat.
4. willingness of other sahabats to pay on behalf (especially the 
successful sahabats)
 Moreover, there are also situations when other random sahabats in 
the centre either in the same group or not (especially the successful 
sahabats) were willingly to pay on behalf of those who fail to make 
the payment for the week. According to the sahabats, this is common 
especially if they have close relationship. 
5. record no collection for the week
 Alternatively, some cikgu decided not to collect from the particular 
sahabat for the week. For the particular sahabat that did not attend 
the meeting and failed to make payment, the cikgu decided to visit 
the sahabat in the near future. Some even decided to report to the 
headquarters especially for the serious cases such as the above 
mentioned centre that had less than 40% attendance rate.
From the observations, it seems that all cikgus have their own ways to 
collect the money for the defaulters. An opportunity to ask one of the heads 
of the branches about such situations, he claimed that there is no standard 
operating procedure for the cikgu to collect money from the defaulters as 
it depends on the cikgu’s discretion. He further added that each situation is 
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unique as sahabats have various reasons for not paying. This includes project 
failure, sickness (either sahabats or dependents), or cash flow problems. 
However, he agreed that methods b), c), and d) above are dangerous and 
need to be properly monitored by the cikgu to avoid the defaulters from 
taking advantage especially if it happens too frequently. 
Telephone Interviews
Later, based on their agreements to be further interviewed for the 
purpose of this study, 12 sahabats were interviewed via telephone. All 
sahabats were asked about the issue of free-riders in their centres if there are 
any. On average, the interview sessions lasted between 10 to 30 minutes. The 
background of the sahabats interviewed is summarized in Table 1 below:
Table 1: Background of the Interviewees
Participants Years in AIM Nature of Business Financial Performance
A 5 Years Food, Craft, Agriculture Monthly Sales: RM3,500
Monthly Profit:RM2,000
ROE:0.20
B 4 Years Craft Monthly Sales: RM2,500
Monthly Profit: RM1,000
ROE: 0.25
C 5 Years Others - Clothes Monthly Sales: RM3,000
Monthly Profit: RM1,000
ROE: 0.14
D 3 Years Food Monthly Sales: RM200
Monthly Profit:RM150
ROE:0.02
E 5 Years Food Monthly Sales: RM5,000
Monthly Profit: RM3,000
ROE: 0.48
F 8 Years Food & Groceries Monthly Sales: RM50,000
Monthly Profit: RM15,000
ROE: 0.75
G 3 Years Agriculture Monthly Sales: RM500
Monthly Profit:RM350
ROE: 0.02
H 3 Years Others – Spa Services Monthly Sales: RM2,000
Monthly Profit: RM1,200
ROE: 0.08
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Participants Years in AIM Nature of Business Financial Performance
I 7 Years Food Monthly Sales: RM1,500
Monthly Profit: RM1,200
ROE: 0.12
J 9 Years Craft Monthly Sales: RM1,000
Monthly Profit: RM500
ROE: 0.06
K 4 Years Food Monthly Sales: RM3,000
Monthly Profit: RM2,400
ROE: 0.30
L 8 Years Food & Craft Monthly Sales: RM5,000
Monthly Profit: RM3,000
ROE: 0.48
During the interview, it was found that two sahabats were directly 
affected by the free-riders in their group. Despite earnings about RM2,000 
and RM3,000 net profit per month, participants A and L, for instance are 
financially challenged as they are also required to pay the AIM loans on 
behalf of the other participants in their groups. Having to admit that they are 
even struggling to meet their weekly repayments, they are more frustrated 
as their group members are taking advantage on them. Undeniably, paying 
for the other members did affect their financial budget as the money can 
be used for other business expenses. As per participant A, she claimed that 
her own loan repayment takes up about 30% of her business expenses and 
the situation worsens as she is also forced to pay for Mrs. X. Extremely 
frustrated with the situation, A is considering quitting from the AIM after 
more than 5 years with the organization.
“My other group members and I were sharing to repay Mrs. X’s 
loan. I myself am paying about RM110 weekly to AIM. Besides 
this, we were sharing around RM10 to RM15 per week for Mrs. 
X. Although the amount seems small, I spend almost RM50 
monthly for her and this has been dragging for 5 months now. 
Instead of paying for Mrs. X, it is better for me to use the money 
to buy raw materials for my business”.  
(Participant A)
Similar issue was also being highlighted by participant L. Apart from 
having one problematic group member, her condition is worse as there are 
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two defaulters in her group. Sharing the burden with the other two group 
members, L declared that she spent about RM300 per week to repay her 
loan and the two defaulters, covering more than 40% of her business’s 
weekly expenses. Believing that various efforts have been taken by her 
group members and the AIM Officers, she asserted that the defaulters are 
just ignoring them. According to participant L,
“We (her group members, the AIM officers, and she herself) 
did go to their house a few months back. But they said that they 
had no money to pay and promised to pay us once they have 
the money. But until today, both were quiet. It is difficult. They 
should know that the loan repayment is compulsory”.  
(Participant L)
Admitting that the other sahabats and even the AIM Trust Assistant 
in the centre are also helping in paying for the two defaulters, L said that 
the burden is on her and her other group members as their future chances 
to borrow more from AIM depend on her group’s repayment performance. 
Having been with AIM for about 8 years, L said that she is extremely 
frustrated with the situations. She further added,
“Although non-repayment was common, it is not normal for 
a participant to simply refuse to repay their loan without any 
reasons. Moreover, their loans were considered as huge at about 
RM5,000 each. And after 8 years, this is the first time I am directly 
affected by this problem. I should be more careful in the future 
(in selecting my group members)”. 
(Participant L)
Besides A and L, majority of the sahabats interviewed agreed that they 
were not pleased if any of the members in their centres are not repaying their 
loan without any concrete reasons. Except for 3 interviewees (Participant A, 
L, and n), others agree that the problem was not significant in their centres. 
However, all of them concurred that if there were any loan discrepancies, 
initially, they would collect money from all members in the centres/groups 
in order to help the particular sahabat in settling her loan payment. “But 
if the situation persists, normally the AIM officer (addressed as Cikgu by 
the sahabat) will take charge. Cikgu will visit their home with the group/
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centre leader asking about their problems,” said Mrs J. “Even sometimes, 
cikgu will help paying the loan on behalf of the sahabat…” according to n. 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, to some extent it seems that the free-riding problem does exist in 
AIM. Although many were trying their level best to pay the loan, including 
borrowing from their family members, some were taking advantage of the 
policy. Thus, as what has happened to the participants A and L, they were 
forced to repay on behalf of their group members. A similar situation was 
observed earlier in this study. As other centres normally recorded more 
than 90% attendance rate, less than half of the sahabats were attending the 
weekly meeting at a particular centre. Asking about the situation, we were 
informed by these sahabats that others refuse to attend the meeting as they 
did not want to pay for the defaults. It started with a person who refused to 
pay for her loan, it spread quickly to other sahabats in the centre. This finding 
is consistent with Kono (2014) that suggested a person is likely to default 
when he or she realizes that other members in the group are irresponsible in 
paying their loan. As some cikgu in AIM were asking all other sahabats in 
the centre (instead of the group) to shoulder for the defaulters, the impact can 
be seen not just in the particular group, but the whole centre. As a result, it is 
expected that the centre will not sustain and will collapse in the near future. 
Shockingly, although the situation is not common, the cikgu admitted that 
similar situations happened before in other centres. not just a loss to AIM, 
the obliged sahabats were also affected as they would miss the opportunity 
to borrow from AIM in the future, indirectly affecting their income. 
Many MFI prefer to adopt the group-based model as it transfers the 
risk from the provider to the borrower. Although it is proven that the model 
is effective in ensuring the high repayment rate, the existence of social 
loafing however shall not be ignored. Exploring the issue among the AIM 
members, this study found that the incidence do exist in this largest and 
oldest MFI in Malaysia, however, the seriousness of this issue is unknown 
and shall be investigated further in the future. From this exploratory study, 
it can be concluded that free-riding is a serious issue that needs to be 
controlled from the beginning. Although the group lending mechanism is 
supposed to transfer the risk from AIM to the sahabats, it was not entirely 
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true when a group of sahabats decided to be the defaulters. As taking legal 
actions against the defaulters would make the poor sahabats to stay away 
from the organization, the officer in charge (Cikgu) needs to take preventive 
measures from the beginning to ensure that free-riding would not be a major 
issue in their centres. 
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